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In this paper we analyze market access blocking properties of a Min-
imum Quality Standard (MQS). For an importing country that imports
a high and low quality good, the welfare maximizing optimal MQS limits
market access only to the high quality firm. This result is further con-
firmed for a uniform MQS imposed by a high quality producing country
that imports a low quality good. The optimal MQS in this case always
blocks entry to the low quality foreign firm. We then propose a Flexi-
ble Quality Standard (FQS). Under a FQS a good is taxed if it does not
meet the standard. Otherwise, imports are exempt from the tariff. Both
firms stay in the market under a FQS and discriminatory import tariff.
Total welfare in this case is greater than under free trade and under the
optimal MQS (for a pure importing country). With uniform conditional
tariffs also both firms stay in the market, however, the welfare obtained
is greater than under free trade and lower than under a MQS.
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1 Introduction
Quality standards have become an integral part of industrial, and international
trade policy. The role of quality standards in trade is highlighted by the debate
on increasing globalization. The fear that standards may limit market access
arises from the fact that they are strictly binding. Any good that does not
meet a standard is not allowed to access a market1 . The issue of market access
is thus important in international trade. For example, in a recent survey by
the OECD2 several countries mention that quality standards work as entry
barriers in developed markets either because they are too high, or non-uniform.
Surprisingly, how the adoption of quality standards affects market access has
not been studied in detail by trade economists.
Authors both in International Trade and Industrial Organization have stud-
ied Minimum Quality Standards (MQS). In International Trade MQS have been
studied by Chiang and Mason (1988), Das and Donnenfeld (1989), and Boom
(1995). Chiang and Masson (1988) show that an MQS above the equilibrium
quality increases quality and equates domestic salaries to world levels. Domestic
welfare increases in this case. Das and Donnenfeld (1989) show that a MQS can
decrease domestic welfare of the country imposing it. Similarly, Boom (1995)
argues that an importing country has incentives to impose a MQS slightly above
the lowest quality produced in an unregulated market.
In Industrial Organization MQS have been studied by Ronnen (1991), Cram-
pes and Hollander (1995), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) and Valletti (2000).
Ronnen (1991) shows that if the government sets a MQS in some determined
range then an equilibrium exists in which both firms stay in the market and
domestic welfare increases. This result, however, is shown not to be robust.
First, the equilibrium of the entire game is not analyzed by Ronnen (1991) in
the sense that he does not solve for the optimum MQS. The analysis is instead
performed for an MQS slightly above the lowest quality in the market. Second,
Valletti (2000) shows that if firms compete in quantity then total welfare can
decrease. Finally, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) (extending Crampes and Hol-
lander (1995)) endogenously determine the optimal MQS in a model without
sunk costs (of quality). The optimal MQS increases total welfare in their model.
In this paper we study the incentives of an importing country to adopt an
optimal MQS in a vertical product differentiation model3 . We first study the
incentives to impose only a MQS. We look at the case of a pure importing
country (with no domestic production) and the case of an importing country
with domestic production. A pure importing country imports both the high
and low quality good. The domestic firm for the importing country is high
quality. This reflects the incentives for developed (higher quality) countries to
impose standards that may work as entry barriers for imports from developing
1This is specially true for trade between developed and underdeveloped countries.
2Annex 4, "Analysis of non-tariff measures: The case of export duties," Working paper of
the trade committee, Trade Directorate-Trade Committee, 2003.
3Note, except Ecchia and Lambertini (2000) none of the papers above have studied the
optimal MQS.
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(lower quality) countries. Market access is blocked under any MQS for the low
quality firm. Given the market access blocking property, we propose a Flexible
Quality Standard (FQS) for the pure importing country case. A FQS allows
imports of a good even if they do not meet the standard, however, any good
that produces a quality below the standard pays an import tariff.
We show that domestic welfare increases over free trade for a pure importing
country if the government were to only choose an optimal MQS. However, the
market is then served by a monopoly4 . This occurs as the optimal MQS is
very high and forces the low quality firm out of the market. The optimal MQS
increases domestic welfare5 relative to free trade. For the case of an importing
country with domestic production we show that the level of the MQS that
maximizes total welfare depends upon the relative weight a government puts
on its firm profits. However, regardless of the weight an optimal MQS always
blocks entry for the low quality foreign firm. For low enough levels of the weight
the government always chooses the highest MQS that gives the domestic firm
zero profits. For high enough weights the MQS is decreasing in the weight and
equals the quality level produced by a domestic monopolist for an infinitely
large weight. Regardless, the optimal MQS is still high enough so as to block
entry for the low quality foreign firm. Interestingly, if a government assigns
equal weights to consumer surplus and domestic firm profits then the optimal
MQS is high enough such that the domestic firm, a monopoly, does not make
monopoly profits. This result is interesting as it points out that a high MQS
may not be simply placed to grant monopoly rights to the domestic firm. In
fact, the domestic firm obtains monopoly profits only if its profits are infinitely
weighed by the domestic government.
Given the market access blocking property of a MQS we propose an ex-post
tariff that is contingent upon some Flexible Quality Standard (FQS) set by the
government. Unlike a MQS, a FQS is flexible in the sense that it allows imports
even if the quality of the good lies below the standard. A firm that meets the
FQS is exempt from the import tariff. Contrarily, a firm that does not meet
the FQS pays an import tariff. In this sense the import tariff is contingent
upon the quality and is time consistent. The advantage6 of the tariff contingent
FQS is that quality improvement is achieved and both the firms still serve the
market. Further, the FQS improves welfare over free trade and a MQS for the
pure importing country.
The government selects its trade policy instrument in two stages. In the
first stage, the government announces the FQS that would exempt a firm from
paying the tariff. The firms, knowing the FQS, then invest in quality. After
firms select quality, the government then chooses its tariff level. The tariff level
is defined by the FQS-tariff rule that the government announces in the first
4Unlike Boom (1995) the importing country does have an incentive to set an MQS. However,
it is high enough such that a monopoly is obtained.
5Contrary to Valleti (2000), in our model, total welfare goes up under a MQS and Cournot
competition.
6Given that the optimal MQS results in a monopoly serving the market (clearly an unre-
alistic situation) and that the optimal tariff decreases quality thereby lowering welfare.
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stage.7 In this sense the import tariff is conditional on the quality chosen by
the firms. Facing such an import tariff exporting firms have two options: invest
in a quality level that is equal, greater, or less, than the minimum (knowing that
it will then face a subsequent tariff). In such a scenario we analyze the effect of
import tariffs chosen by an importing country when the imported good is of a
high and low quality. We show that if the government were to set a conditional
import tariff then domestic welfare goes up8 . Conditional import tariffs increase
consumer surplus, market coverage and total welfare of the importing country.
Setting a FQS the government is able to influence quality investment in a
positive manner benefitting domestic consumers. Due to greater commitment
power of the government (relative to that of the firm) it is able to positively
influence quality investment by the firms. This is the strategic advantage that
the government loses if were to choose tariffs that were not conditional on the
FQS. The firm is able to counteract the effectiveness of a single instrument, i.e.
tariff, by strategically decreasing its quality investment. However, under the
conditional tariff the government is able to counteract this negative effect on
quality through the FQS.
We show that outcomes depend upon whether the government is able to set
a discriminative, or uniform, conditional tariffs for the, high and low quality,
imported goods. If the government were to discriminate and set a different
conditional import tariff for the high and low quality firm it would obtain a
higher level of welfare. In this case the FQS would be set high enough such that
the low quality firm would pay the import tariff thus increasing government
revenues. The high quality firm on the other hand produces a quality just equal
to the FQS and evades paying the tariff. If the government were to only charge
a uniform conditional tariff then it only directly influences quality investment
by the low quality firm. The high quality firm prefers the situation where both
the firms pay the import tariff. The uniform tariff is high enough for the low
quality firm and relatively low for the high quality firm. A high FQS-tariff
seriously undermines the competitiveness of the low quality firm. As a result,
paying the tariff the high quality firm increases its profits taking advantage of
the negative effect it has on its rival. Total welfare achieved under a conditional
discriminative, and uniform, tariff is greater than under free trade. Note that,
our results show that including variables such as quality (that positively impact
consumer surplus) can have an important effect on results.9
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model un-
der free trade. Section 3 studies the optimal and market access blocking MQS.
Section 4 studies Flexible Quality Standards (import tariffs conditional on qual-
ities). Section 5 concludes.
7The issue of intervention as a strategic choice has been analysed by several authors.
Cooper and Riezman (1989), Arvan (1991), Shivakumar (1993) and Hwang and Shulman
(1994) model government policy in two stages . In these papers the government first announces
the trade policy instrument and later decides on its level.
8Unlike the effect of a specific import tariff (Hernán and Kujal, 2003).
9 In our model quality investment is a long run variable that allows firms to commit before
governments fix their tariff levels. See Grossman (1988), Sutton (1991) and Herguera, Kujal
and Petrakis (2000,2002) for a discussion on long and short run competition variables.
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2 The model
We study a vertically differentiated industry where a high and low quality firm
export to a third market. There is no domestic consumption in the exporting
countries. The third country is a pure consumer of the imported goods and has
no domestic production10. Consumers are uniformly distributed in the import-
ing country and are identified by their taste parameter θ, which is distributed
uniformly over the interval
£
0, θ
¤
, with θ > 0. Each consumer has unitary de-
mand for the good. A consumer with parameter θ obtains utility U = θs − p,
if he purchases one unit of the good at price p and quality s, s1 > s2. Utility
is zero if a consumer does not purchase the good. Note that θ can also be in-
terpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income and quality ratio
(Tirole, 1989, p. 97).
The high and low quality firm compete in quantities. In the first stage firms
invest in quality which is then taken as given in the quantity competition stage.
In this sense quality is a long run decision variable. Firms first choose quality
and then compete in quantities. The marginal cost of production, c, is constant
and is independent of costs of quality. The marginal cost of production is set
equal to zero without loss of generality. Quality costs are fixed and costs of qual-
ity improvement are increasing. This specification captures the characteristics
of a (pure) vertical product differentiation model. Shaked and Sutton (1983)
define a purely vertically differentiated industry as one in which the costs of
quality improvement fall primarily into fixed costs and involve only a modest,
or no, increase in unit variable costs. Quality costs borne in the first stage are
treated as sunk in the market competition stage. For reasons of tractability we
assume that quality costs are quadratic, s2/2. We solve the game using subgame
perfection.
2.1 Quantity competition
We first determine the demand function faced by the firms. Let θ12 be the
taste parameter of the consumer that is indifferent between purchasing the high,
or low, quality good. Setting, θ12s1 − p1 = θ12s2 − p2, we can then write
θ12 = p1−p2s1−s2 . Similarly, we define θ02 as the taste parameter of the consumer
that is indifferent between purchasing the low quality good and not purchasing
at all. Setting, θ02s2 − p2 = 0, we then get θ02 = p2s2 . Given θ12 and θ02 we can
now determine the demand that each firm faces.
D1(p1, p2, s1, s2) = θ −
p1 − p2
s1 − s2
D2(p1, p2, s1, s2) =
p1 − p2
s1 − s2
− p2s2
10Later we relax this assumption to allow for domestic production in the importing country.
Under free trade the equilibrium qualities are unchanged for both models.
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Figure 1: Quality reaction functions under free trade.
Where, D1(p1, p2, s1, s2) is the demand faced by the high quality firm and
D2(p1, p2, s1, s2) is the demand faced by the low quality firm. These then give
us the indirect demands:
p1 = s1θ− s1q1 − s2q2 (1a)
p2 = s2θ− s2q1 − s2q2 (1b)
Firms maximize profits. The equilibrium quantities in this stage are given
by:
q1 =
(2s1 − s2) θ
4s1 − s2
(2a)
q2 =
s1θ
4s1 − s2
(2b)
Given quantities [2a] and [2b] firms choose qualities in the first stage. Max-
imizing profits πi = pi · qi − s
2
i
2 , with respect to qualities gives us the first order
conditions:
∂Π1
∂s1
= 0; s1 = θ
2 16s31 − 12s21s2 + 4s1s22 − s32
(4s1 − s2)3
(3a)
∂Π2
∂s2
= 0; s2 = θ
2 s21 (4s1 + s2)
(4s1 − s2)3
(3b)
The quality reaction functions [3a] and [3b] are described in the figure 1.
The intersection of the reaction function correspond to the Nash equilibrium in
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quality choices:
s∗1 = 0.2519θ
2
s∗2 = 0.0902θ
2
Given qualities one can then write the prices, quantities and profits11 :
sFT1 = 0.251942θ
2 sFT2 = 0.090223θ
2 qFT1 = 0.450834θ qFT2 = 0.274583θ
pFT1 = 0.1133584θ
3 pFT2 = 0.024774θ
3 ΠFT1 = 0.01947θ
4 ΠFT2 = 0.002732θ
4
Table 1: Equilibrium values under free trade.
Consumer surplus is defined by the following expression:
CS =
Z θ12
θ02
(θsFT2 − pFT2 )dθ+
Z θ
θ12
(θsFT1 − pFT1 )dθ
Total welfare in this case is defined by the sum of the consumer surplus of the
high and low quality consumers, and is given by:
CSFT = 0.040174θ4 SWFT = 0.040174θ4
3 Minimum quality standards (MQS)
The main debate relating to market access is that the imposition of a MQS
blocks access to the market for the lower quality firms. This is in fact one
of the concerns of developing countries regarding market access in developed
economies. We show that a MQS imposed by a pure importing country, with no
domestic production, or by an importing country that has a high quality domes-
tic firm, always results in blocked access for the low quality firm. Our results
confirm that quality standards may in fact work as entry blocking devices to-
wards low quality goods. To our knowledge this is the first theoretical treatment
that has shown the market entry blocking property of quality standards.
We first study an MQS for a pure importing country (that has no domestic
production). We show that in this case the importing country sets a MQS
such that only the high quality firm supplies the market making zero profits.
The rationale behind imposing the MQS may be to benefit the local firm. We
extend the model to allow for this possibility. We study the incentives to impose
a MQS for the case of an importing country with domestic production, where
the domestic firm produces high quality. We also allow for the possibility that
the government assigns different weights (m) to domestic profits (relative to
consumer surplus).
11These are the values that one obtains in the free trade model (see Motta, (1993)).
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3.1 Pure Importing Country
We first present the results for an optimal MQS. Note that a MQS below the free
trade level of low quality is ineffective as it does not affect quality investments.
The government thus always sets the MQS above the free trade level of low
quality. This makes it always binding for the low quality firm. It is easy to
see that if an importing country imposes an MQS then only the high quality
firm supplies the market. The reason behind this is simple. Domestic welfare,
SW = CS =
R θ12
θ02 (θs2 − p2)dθ +
R θ
θ12(θs1 − p1)dθ, is increasing in quality
12 . As
the MQS increases the low quality firm no longer finds it profitable to increase its
quality. For a MQS of 0.1867θ2 it stops selling in the foreign market (see figure
2). Beyond this point the domestic market is supplied by a foreign monopoly.
In this case social welfare is simply the consumer surplus from consuming the
high quality good.
It is interesting to see how the choice of the MQS alters Social Welfare
(SW) for the importing country. In figure 2 one can see that Social Welfare is
increasing as the low quality firm, in response to the MQS, increases its quality
beyond the free trade level (sFT2 ). However, at the quality level of 0.1867θ
2
it
exits the market. At this point the SW drops as the market is served only
by the high quality foreign firm selling at the free trade level of quality (sFT1 ).
Beyond this point SW is increasing in the MQS and reaches its maximum at a
quality level of 0.5θ2. At this point the foreign monopolist makes zero profits.
Note, however, that SW for the importing country is same at points A and
B. This implies that the importing country would either choose an MQS low
enough such that both the firms stay in the market, this point would then lie
to the left of A, or it would choose a MQS in the range BC, where a monopolist
would serve the market. As stated earlier SW is maximized at C. The results
are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium the market is supplied by a monopolist. Under
the optimal MQS (= 0.5θ2) the foreign monopolist makes zero profits. Social
welfare under the optimal MQS (0.0625θ4) is greater than under free trade(0.040174θ4).
3.2 Importing Country High Quality
We now study the incentives for an importing country with domestic production
to impose a MQS on the low quality imported good. The domestic market is
served by the high quality firm. This scenario reflects the market access problem
raised by developing economies. The claim is that high quality standards work
as entry barriers, thus making entry difficult for firms from developed markets.
In this section we study the case of a high quality country that imports a low
quality good. We analyze two cases. In the first case, we look at the MQS that
blocks entry for the low quality foreign firm. We call this the prohibitive MQS.
Note, however, that a prohibitive MQS need not be optimal and as a result may
12Note that an importing country does not bear sunk costs of quality.
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Figure 2: Social welfare and MQS in a pure importing country
not be welfare maximizing. As a result we also analyze the MQS that maximizes
Total Welfare for the importing country. We call this the optimal MQS. Notice
that a prohibitive MQS may be simply motivated to block entry and directly
benefit the domestic firm. While an optimal MQS is set keeping in mind the
total welfare of the economy.
3.2.1 The Prohibitive MQS
The MQS that impedes the entry of the low quality firm is the one that gives
the low quality firm zero profits, and with the domestic firm maximizing on its
best response. This can be written as:
max
s2
π2(s2;s1) = 0
such that,
s2 ≥ MQS
s1 = BR1(s2)
Where BR1(s2) is the reaction function for firm 1 (see 3a). The solution
to the above gives us the MQS that results in zero profits for the low quality
firm, i.e. MQSB = 0.18667θ2. At this MQS the firms produce qualities s1 =
0.25685θ2 and s2 = 0.18667θ
2
. Note that if the low quality firm were to decide
to stay out of the market then the high quality firm becomes a monopolist. The
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quality produced by the monopolist is, sM1 = 0.25θ
2. This then implies that the
MQS that gives a domestic monopoly is prohibitive13.
Under a prohibitive MQS the monopolist offers a single quality of the good.
The consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the good has the
taste parameter θM = pMsM (the subscript M stands for the domestic monopolist
case). All the consumers with θ < θ < θM purchase the good with quality sM .
The monopolist thus faces the demand curve
x(pM , sM ) = θ −
pM
sM
and its profits are πM = sM (θ − xM)xM − s
2
M
2 . Maximizing first with respect
to sM and then with xM ,we obtain x∗M = 0.5θ and s∗M = 0.25θ
2
. Then the
equilibrium outcome under the prohibitive MQS is:
s∗M = 0.25θ
2
x∗M = 0.5θ π∗M = 0.03125θ
4
CS∗M = 0.03125θ
4 TW ∗M = 0.03125θ
4
(1+m)
Table 2: Equilibrium values under a monopoly.
The domestic monopolist serves half the market and offers a quality level
that is (slightly) lower than the high quality produced under free trade (sFT1 =
0.25194θ2). The total output sold in the market is substantially lower than with
free trade (x∗M = 0.5θ < xFT1 + xFT2 = .7254θ).
Note, however, that prohibiting entry is only beneficial for the domestic
government for sufficiently high m. It is easy to see that social welfare is always
greater than free trade for m > 0.75756. The results are summarized in the
proposition below.
Proposition 2 Under a prohibitive MQS the market is supplied by a monop-
olist. The minimum quality that results in zero profits for the low quality firm
and results in blocked entry is MQSB = 0.18667θ2. For sufficiently large m,
m > 0.75756, total welfare with a prohibitive MQS (0.03125θ4(1+m)) is greater
than under free trade (0.040174θ4 +m0.01947θ4).
13The size of the MQS depends upon how the domestic firm reacts to entry. If the domestic
firm cannot optimally adjusts its quality, the MQS which block access is defined by
max
s2
π2(s2;s1) = 0
such that,
s2 ≥ MQS
s1 = 0.25θ
2
The MQS that solves the condition above is MQS eB = 0.19098θ2.
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Figure 3: Social Welfare and MQS with domestic production
3.2.2 The optimal MQS
The optimal MQS is the one that maximizes total welfare for the country. As
before, a MQS below, or equal, to the free trade level of low quality does not
affect total welfare. The level of the MQS that maximizes total welfare depends
on the weight one sets on domestic firm profits.
As can be seen from figure 3 a MQS is effective only above the free trade
level of low quality. For a MQS above this level of quality, total welfare can
increase, or decrease, depending upon the size of m. For m > 0.7601 total
welfare first declines. The decline continues till the low quality firm exits the
market (figure 3). For m < 0.723 total welfare first increases. The increase in
total welfare continues till the low quality firm exits the market. In the range
0.7601 > m > 0.723, however, for low values ofMQS total welfare first increases
and then declines. These results hold for MQS below the prohibitive level. Our
results add to the literature where a MQS slightly above the low quality is
shown to increase welfare (Ronnen (1991), Boom (1995), Valletti (2000)). We
11
show that this may not always be the case.
Further note that once the government sets the MQS> 0.25θ2 the optimal
one depends on the value taken by m (see figure 3). Given that the domestic
firm always meets the MQS one can write total welfare as,
SW = sθ
2
8
+m(sθ
2
4
− s
2
2
)
The quality level that maximizes total welfare in this case will be the following.
s = θ
2
8m(1+ 2m)
Keeping in mind that π1 is not positive if s1 > θ
2
2 , then the optimal value of s
will be:
MQS∗ =
(
θ2(1+2m)
8m m >
1
2
θ2
2 m ≤
1
2
)
Total welfare then is:
SW ∗ =
(
θ4(1+2m)2
128m m >
1
2
(1+m)θ4
32
m ≤ 1
2
)
.
The first thing that one sees is that for m ≤ 1
2
the MQS is independent of m.
For values of m > 1
2
the optimal MQS is decreasing in m. It can be easily seen
that as m becomes large enough the optimal MQS tends to 0.25θ2. This is the
level of quality produced by a domestic monopoly. This insight is interesting
as this shows that the MQS is smaller as the weight given to industry profits
increases. However, regardless of the size of m any resulting MQS blocks entry
for the low quality firm. This result thus confirms the market access blocking
property of a MQS. The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal MQS is decreasing in the weight placed on domes-
tic firm profits. Regardless of the weight placed on domestic firm profits a MQS
always results in total welfare greater than under free trade and the low quality
firm is excluded from the market even for the lowest MQS.
4 Flexible quality standards and import tariffs
How trade policy instruments may affect long run variables in markets was
pointed out by Grossman (1988). In our model the government has two target
variable, namely, quality and output. Hence, a more appropriate government
policy may be one that uses two instruments on (its) two target variables, i.e.
quality and output. We argue that such policy instruments are more appro-
priate for industries characterized by the presence of both long, and short, run
12
variables. In fact one observes that at any point of time any industry faces
a combination of (multiple) industrial policy instruments such as MQS, tariffs
and Voluntary Export Restraints etc.
Keeping this in mind we propose a non-linear policy instrument that can be
used by governments in such industries. We propose the use of Flexible Quality
Standards (FQS). If a firm invests above the flexible FQS it is exempt from
paying the import tariff, otherwise, it pays the tariff. In our structure a FQS
and import tariffs are a pair of possible policy instruments14 at the governments
disposal. FQS’s are less restrictive than Minimum Quality Standards as they
permit the sale of the good if the quality of the good is below the limit set
by the standard. Most industries have quality standards as an integral part of
a governments industrial policy. Our use of flexible QS’s is motivated by the
fact that a government valuing consumer welfare finds in its interest to promote
quality investment by firms due to their welfare improving effects. In fact a
FQS achieves improvement in average quality a motivation behind the use of,
much more restrictive, MQS’s.
The tariff depends upon the quality level chosen by the firm and in this sense
is conditional on it. We analyze two types of conditional tariffs. In the first case
the government sets a uniform quality conditional tariff (applied to both the
firms) on its imports. In the second case the government is allowed to discrim-
inate between the firms when setting the conditional tariff. The government
in this case can set a different conditional tariff for the high, and low, quality
firm. The sequence of moves that we study is the following (see figure 4). The
government first sets the QS. Given the FQS firms then invest in quality. A
firm may, or may not, choose to meet the QS. If the firms meet, or exceed, the
FQS they pay no tariffs on their exports. The quality chosen by the firms is
of course decided by the trade-off between the profits gained by the marginal
quality increment and the increase in quality costs such that the firm does not
pay the import tariff15 .
Figure 4: The Conditional Tariff Game.
The government is interested in such a policy as the cost of quality improve-
ment falls only on the exporting countries. An increase in quality in this case
14We only consider these two policy instruments in this paper.
15Such a separation of government policy has been studied before by several authors in
a different context. Cooper and Riezman (1989) study a model in which the government
first studies what trade policy instrument to use (subsidies or quotas on exports) and in a
later stage decide on the levels. Arvan (1991) and Shivakumar (1993) extend this model and
study the effect of choosing its policy before (assuming commitment), or after (assuming no
commitment), the firms get to know their true demands.
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implies an increase in the importing countries welfare through the increase in
consumer surplus. Looking at it this way the conditional tariff can be inter-
preted as a mechanism to increase firm investment in quality above the levels
observed under free trade. Of course, by choosing its quality investment the
firm decides whether it is in its benefit to choose a quality that exempts it from
paying the tariff, or not.
In the following section we study such conditional tariffs. First we study a
uniform conditional tariff that is the same for both the low and high quality
firm. This is followed by the analysis of the discriminative conditional tariff.
4.1 Discriminatory conditional tariff
In this section we look at the possibility that the government sets a different
conditional import tariff for both the exporting firms. The advantage of the
discriminative conditional tariff is that it allows the government to influence the
quality investment of the high quality firm. Knowing that welfare is increasing
in high quality, the government chooses a high enough FQS that results in the
high quality firm meeting the standard and not paying the tax. In the case
of the discriminatory tariff the high quality firm does not have the incentive
to lower its quality investment and pay the import tariff. The incentives for
the high quality firm are just the opposite in this case. Under a discriminatory
conditional tariff the government chooses a high QS. In equilibrium the high
quality firm invests exactly equal to the FQS and earns less than it would if
it were to pay an import tariff. The low quality firm, meanwhile, selects a
substantially lower quality (relative to the uniform conditional tariff), selling
less and makes less profits. A discriminatory conditional tariff works to the
detriment of both the firms.
This is seen in the figure 5 where, πLT1 indicates profits for the high quality
firm when only the low quality firm pays the tariff. π eB1 , on the other hand,
indicates profits for the high quality firm when both the firms pay the conditional
import tariff. It is thus clear that if the government were to choose the FQS
below sL1 then it will be non-binding on the high quality firm as it will always
choose sL1 maximizing profits at L. The area to the right of L is thus the region
in which the government can increase total welfare (with the high quality firm
increasing its quality investment). Noticing that total welfare is increasing in
s1 the government wants the high quality firm to moves down its profit curve
(πLT1 ). The highest FQS the government will choose is M^CH that leaves the
high quality firm indifferent between paying the tariff making π eB1 (point eB), or
not paying the tariff and staying at point M^CH(= es∗). Under a discriminative
tariff the government thus chooses a FQS that coincides with es∗(= 0.450403θ2)
maximizing total welfare.
Note, however, if both the firms pay the tariff then the welfare obtained by
the government is much lower (SW eB = 0.02355θ4 at es eB1 ) than if only the low
quality firm pays the tariff. Any FQS slightly below M^CH gives the government
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Figure 5: Profits high-quality firm and total welfare under a discriminative
conditional tariff.
welfare greater than the case where the high quality firm chooses quality es eB1 .
Proposition 4 The importing country, setting discriminatory tariffs, increases
welfare over free trade (and uniform the conditional tariff) setting a MQL> sL1 .
The welfare maximizing MQL is es∗ = 0.450403θ2 and each firm pays tariff:
t1 = s1(3s1−s2)θ9s1−s2 and t2 =
2s1s2θ
9s1−s2 . Welfare under the discriminatory conditional
tariff equals SW = 0.062528θ4.
The equilibrium values obtained under the discriminatory tariff are summa-
rized in the table below.
ses1 = 0.450403θ2 ses2 = 0.06562θ2 qes1 = 0.481565θ qes2 = 0.253073θ
pes1 = 0.216898θ3 pes2 = 0.017413θ3 Πes1 = 0.003019θ4 Πes2 = 0.00205θ4
Table 3: Equilibrium values under the discriminative conditional tariff.
As can be seen, only the low quality firm pays the import tariff t2 =
0.000806θ3. Tariff revenues obtained by the government are R = 0.000204θ4
and consumer surplus for the high and low quality consumers, respectively, is
CS1 = 0.060222θ
4
and CS2 = 0.002101θ
4
.
The discriminative conditional tariff has important effects on the strategic
choice of quality by both the low, and high, quality firm. Both firms earn less
profits. The low quality firm decreases quality investment and the high quality
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firm increases quality investment. Consumer surplus and total welfare under
a discriminatory conditional tariff is greater than under any other tariff policy.
Under a discriminatory tariff the government is able to affect quality investment
by the high quality firm. This ability to affect quality investment of the high
quality firm, is not present under the uniform tariff.
4.2 Uniform conditional tariff
The government first announces the FQS. The FQS informs the firms on the
minimum quality that exempts their exports from the tariff. Following this
announcement firms decide on their quality investment. The quality chosen
by the firms determines whether they will be subject to the import tariff, or
not. After the firms decide on their qualities, the government (observing the
qualities) announces the tariff. Finally, the firms compete in quantities.
It is easy to see that if the FQS is at, or less than, the low quality chosen
under free trade it has no impact upon the qualities chosen by the firms. Further,
if the FQS equals the quality chosen by the low quality firm under free trade
tariff revenues are zero. Thus the government is only able to change the qualities
and generate tariff revenues if the FQS exceeds the (low) quality chosen under
free trade, sFT2 = 0.090223θ¯. If the FQS is slightly above sFT2 the low quality
firm has two options. The first is to invest below sFT2 paying the import tariff
and the other is to invest above it. If the firm decides to pay the import tariff
once more it chooses sFT2 . In the case that the firm invests above sFT2 then it
will always choose the FQS set by the government. Given that total welfare is
increasing in quality the government is interested in setting a FQS above sFT2 .
Figure 6: Total welfare and profits under conditional tariff: Low Quality Firm
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In figure 6 we see the maximum profits of the low quality firm given the
best response of the high quality firm (see [3a] paying no tariff) for quality sFT2 .
Beyond sFT2 profits in equilibrium will be smaller if the firm invests more in
quality. Contrarily, total welfare (SWFT ) increases in low quality (given that
no firm pays the tariff and the rival best responding). The low quality firm
always sets its quality equal to the FQS (given that it earns greater than setting
a lower quality and paying the import tariff). That is,
s2 = s if Π2 (fr1(s; t1 = t2 = 0), s) > ΠL2
s2 = sL2 otherwise
It is interesting to see how the choice of the uniform conditional tariff in-
fluences quality choice by the two firms. Looking at the figure we see that any
QS5 sFT2 does not affect quality investment for either firm. Further, as nei-
ther firms pay the tariff the government does not change the equilibrium from
free trade. Thus the government only gains if it sets a FQS above sFT2 . For a
FQS above sFT2 we see that the low quality firm still makes greater profits than
paying the tariff and staying at point L (on ΠLT2 ). The low quality firm always
chooses the FQS till the point MCL where its profits exactly equal the profits
at point L. If the FQS were to be greater than MCL it always chooses point L.
The government thus knows that it can only increase low quality in the range
(sFT2 , s∗].
In figure 6 we can observe that the profits for the low quality firm that
meets the FQS and pays the import tariff are represented by the point MCL.
This point corresponds to a quality level , s2 = s∗ = 0.133885θ
2, for the low
quality firm. In the case that the government sets s∗ as the FQS the equilibrium
values are the following:
ss1 = 0.254011θ
2 ss2 = 0.133885θ
2 qs1 = 0.424115θ qs2 = 0.287942θ
ps1 = 0.10773θ
3 ps2 = 0.038551θ
3 Πs1 = 0.013429θ
4 Πs2 = 0.002138θ
4
Table 4: Equilibrium values: Uniform conditional tariff.
Given that both the firms invest above the required minimum, neither pays
the import tariff. The government thus earns zero tariff revenues. Total con-
sumer (total) surplus in this case is CSs = SW s = 0.044745θ4. Total welfare
obtained under a uniform tariff is greater than under free trade, SWFT =
0.040174θ4.
Lemma 1 Total welfare under a uniform conditional tariff, SW s = 0.044745θ4,
is greater than under free trade, SWFT = 0.040174θ4. Neither firm pays the
import tariff producing quality at, or above, the MQL.
Quality investment by both the firms is greater than under free trade. As
a result profits for both the firms decline. The government is able to increase
quality investment and achieves a higher level of welfare. Even though prices
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increase and total output declines the increase in quality more than compensates
for the increase in the price and the fall in output. Consumer surplus for both,
the low and high, quality consumers is greater than under free trade.
If the government sets the FQS above s∗ the low quality firm prefers to
produce the quality sLT2 , paying the import tariff and making greater profits.
On the other hand the government has no incentive to set the FQS above s∗as
it decreases total welfare.
It now interesting to look at the incentives of the high quality firm given
that the QS>s∗. Profits for the high quality firm are denoted by πLT1 when
the low quality firm pays the tariff. Profits for the high quality firm are much
higher (πB1 ) if both firms pay the tariff. In any range between B and MCH the
high quality firm will always choose a quality slightly below the QS. Further,
knowing that a high tariff works to the detriment of the low quality firm the
high quality firm always invests below the FQS in the range (B,MCH] making
greater profits. The government, however, never wants both the firms to pay
the tariff as its welfare is lower in this case (SWB < SWLT ). Knowing that
it cannot increase quality investment of the high quality firm above sB1 , the
government, always prefers a FQS in the range (sFT2 , s∗].
Figure 7: Total welfare and profits for the high quality firm: Uniform conditional
tariff.
The results under a uniform conditional tariff are summarized in the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 5 The government maximizes total welfare choosing a MQL of
s∗ = 0.133885θ2. In equilibrium no firm pays the import tariff. The low quality
firm sets its quality (s∗2) exactly equal to the MQL and the high quality firm
18
produces quality ss1 = 0.254011θ
2
.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that optimal MQS limit access to markets. A country choos-
ing a MQS will maximize welfare for a high enough MQS so that the market
is only served by a foreign monopolist. The domestic market is served by a
monopoly both for the case of a pure importing and an importing country with
domestic production. This confirms the general perception that quality stan-
dards work towards limiting access to markets, especially from countries that
sell lower quality goods. To our knowledge this is the first theoretical treatment
of this issue. It is easy to see that this outcome is achieved due to the binding
constraints that an MQS imposes upon imports.
In this paper we first study the incentives to impose a MQS for a pure
importing country. The results in this case are clear. The domestic government
maximizes total welfare, in this case the total consumer surplus, and sets a high
enough MQS so that the high quality firm makes zero profits. The motivation
for a high MQS is borne more out of the effect of an increase in quality on
consumer surplus. However, the end outcome is that the domestic market is
served by a monopoly16. The optimal MQS increases domestic welfare relative
to free trade under such a MQS.
For the case of an importing country with domestic production we show that
the level of the MQS that maximizes total welfare depends upon the relative
weight a government puts on its firm profits. However, regardless of the weight
there always exists a MQS which blocks entry for the low quality foreign firm.
For low enough levels of the weight the government always chooses the highest
MQS that gives the domestic firm zero profits. For high enough weights the MQS
is decreasing in the weight and equals the quality level produced by a domestic
monopolist when the weight is infinitely large. However, the optimal MQS is still
high enough so as to block entry for the low quality foreign firm. Interestingly,
if a government assigns equal weights to consumer surplus and domestic firm
profits then the optimal MQS is high enough such that the domestic firm does
not make monopoly profits. This result is interesting as it points out that
high MQS may not be placed to grant monopoly rights to the domestic firm.
This would occur at low levels of MQS. In fact, the MQS that gives monopoly
profits occurs in the limit when the government assigns an infinitely high weight
(with respect to consumer surplus) to its profits. This outcome, however, seems
extremely unlikely.
Given the market access blocking property of a MQS we propose a Flexible
Quality Standard as an alternative to the existing use of quality standards. We
propose a conditional import tariff as an alternative trade policy instrument.
The conditional import tariff depends on a certain FQS whereby, any firm failing
to meet it pays an import tariff. In this sense, the FQS is a generalized version
16Unlike Boom (1995) the importing country does have an incentive to set an MQS. However,
it is high enough such that a monopoly is obtained.
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of the Minimum Quality Standard as it allows sale of a good below a certain
minimum threshold (under a MQS this tariff is prohibitive). A firm unable to
meet the threshold simply pays the tariff. We show that if the government has
at its disposal two instruments (a FQS and a conditional import tariff) and two
targets (output and quality) then the conditional import tariff can be a welfare
improving policy tool in the hands of an importing government.
If a firm does not meet this minimum it pays an import tariff, otherwise
it is exempt. In this manner the government has an instrument for quality (a
FQS) and an instrument for output (a tariff). With such a two-part instrument
a government obtains greater domestic welfare than under a MQS or under
free trade. We analyze two different conditional tariffs. First, we study a dis-
criminative tariff. Subsequently we study a uniform conditional tariff that is
the same for both, high and low quality, firms. We show that highest welfare
is obtained by an importing country under a discriminative conditional tariff.
Welfare under a discriminative tariff is higher than under free trade, a MQS, or a
uniform conditional tariff. The incentives for governments to use discriminatory
instruments are high in our model.
The effect on quality chosen by the firms is different under a uniform and a
discriminative conditional tariff. A uniform conditional tariff has a detrimental
effect on the low quality firm. The high quality firm in this case can lower
quality investment thus increasing the competitive pressure on the low quality
firm. This clearly works to the detriment of the low quality firm that makes
lower profits. The government, however, is unable to affect quality investment
by the high quality firm under the uniform conditional tariff. The FQS chosen
in equilibrium is such that neither the low, nor the high, quality firm pay the
conditional import tariff. The low quality firm chooses a substantially higher
level of quality than under free trade. Even though in equilibrium neither firm
pays the conditional import tariff total welfare increases due to the increase in
consumer surplus (average quality increases).
The FQS set by the government lies in the intermediate range of the qualities
chosen by the firms under free trade. The reason is that the high quality firm
will never produce a quality greater than it does under free trade. In fact, for
a high enough FQS, it is in the interest of the high quality firm to choose a
quality level slightly below the FQS provoking a higher tax17 on the low quality
firm18. The high import tariff decreases the competitiveness of the low quality
firm. This works to the advantage of the high quality firm and it earns greater
profits than it would earn otherwise. However, it is not to the advantage of the
government to set a high FQS. A high FQS lowers quality investment by both
the firms resulting in lower total welfare. The government, as a result, selects
an FQS that is somewhere between the qualities chosen by the two firms under
free trade.
The story under the discriminative conditional tariff is different. The gov-
17The import tariff paid by both the firms is greater than when only the low quality firm
pays it.
18The strategy of reducing its quality investment and paying the tariff is optimal for the
high quality firm for a MQL greater than 0.137533θ2.
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ernment is able to affect quality investment by both the firms under the discrim-
inative tariff. Each firm pays a separate tariff, the FQS is high enough such that
the quality chosen by the high quality firm is substantially higher than under
free trade. The low quality firm, however, invests less in quality. Total domestic
welfare of the importing country is greater than under both free trade and the
uniform conditional tariff. The low quality firm pays an import tariff while the
high quality firm produces at the FQS (not paying the import tariff). Output
sold in the market is higher. Firm profits are, however, much lower than under
free trade.
In this paper we have shown that a MQS always blocks entry for the low
quality firm. An interesting result obtained in the importing country case is that
the domestic firm being a monopolist never earns monopoly profits. Clearly this
occurs as the MQS is imposed uniformly across the domestic and the foreign
firm. The domestic firm would obtain monopoly profits only in the case when the
MQS applies to the foreign firm. Domestic welfare in this case is, however, lower
than in the case where the MQS is imposed upon both the firms. Given that
the MQS blocks entry we propose a new policy instrument. Here we flexibilize
the MQS making it nonbinding if the qualities below it are taxed. We show
that in this case a discriminative FQS results in greater welfare than under free
trade or any other MQS.
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